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Abstract—The remote ECG communicates over the public 
Internet, and the public Internet security is not sufficient to 
ensure the information security of the remote ECG system. 
User data disclosure poses a security threat to the system. The 
ECG information security solution proposed in this paper 
adopts the method of preset multi-key-per-machine at the 
factory to avoid leakage caused by personnel factors, and uses 
the hash function to generate a secondary password for 
communication encryption during network transmission. 
Experiments show that this program can effectively resist the 
existing various attack methods and fully protect patient data 
security. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the remote ECG system, because the terminals are 
distributed in the vast number of families, clinics, 
community hospitals, etc., there are problems in the 
management of physical equipment. Since the ECG data is 
communicated through the Internet, there is a problem that 
the communication data packet can be intercepted and 
monitored. Due to the diversification of commercial 
channels and construction teams, there is also a risk of 
technical confidentiality leaks. 
This paper proposes a remote ECG system data 
encryption mechanism, which generates unable-to-remember 
keys by means of a random number generator, establishes a 
multi-key model, and implements the encryption storage and 
secure communication technology for periodic replacement 
of keys. 
The core design concept of this program is: human 
beings as a confidential subject is also a key factor in 
generating leaks. If every link of encryption is implemented 
by an automatic algorithm and the artificial factors are 
completely eliminated, the patient data security can still be 
effectively protected in the presence of the above security 
management vulnerability. 
II. DESIGN OF INFORMATION SECURITY SCHEME FOR 
REMOTE ECG SYSTEM 
The key protocol developed in this paper contains 
mechanisms for key generation, storage, deployment, and 
verification. This scheme takes into account various attacks 
such as brute force cracking by attackers and interception of 
network communication packets. 
A. Hardware risk control scheme 
The hardware of the device may be disassembled, and the 
data on the storage device can be taken out. If the attacker 
can obtain two devices of the same model, the content of the 
key can be known through the content comparison. 
A common method of hardware attacks is the wiretap 
method. For example, a logic analyzer records and analyzes 
the timing of signals on the memory bus of the memory 
device. Practice has proved that ordinary memory devices, 
such as Nor Flash chip, Nand Flash chip or I2C bus serial 
memory cannot resist the wiretap method attack. 
Therefore, we must use the Tamper-Resistant Security 
Module (TRSM) to store the encryption key. In theory, pure 
software encryption cannot guarantee the security of the key 
when there is a possibility that the hardware is disassembled. 
This solution uses a TRSM with a capacity of 1k bytes, 
which costs about $0.50, and the cost increase for the entire 
device is negligible. 
B. Research on Key Agreement of multi-key-per-machine 
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A multi-key-per-machine encryption algorithm is used to 
encrypt patient data in the terminal device memory. Patient 
data can be sent to the cloud very quickly, but we need to 
consider the device features in the off-network state. So local 
storage is still an indispensable feature. 
Considering that the terminal equipment needs to deal 
with many tasks such as write memory, waveform curve 
drawing, network communication, alarm and other 
emergency processing, the encryption algorithm should not 
adopt an overly complex algorithm. The key point of 
prevention is to be able to prevent attackers from 
implementing bulk cracking on same model devices. 
Therefore, the key issue of encryption is the key design and 
the key storage. 
DOI: 10.21307/ijanmc-2019-018
International Journal of Advanced Network, Monitoring and Controls          Volume 03, No.04, 2018 
32 
C. Key design 
User data (patient ECG data) is encrypted using a block 
cipher encryption scheme. A block cipher is also called a 
symmetry cipher. When encrypting plaintext by using a 
block cipher, firstly, the plaintext needs to be grouped, each 
group has the same length, and then each set of plaintexts is 
separately encrypted to obtain a ciphertext of the same length. 
A block cipher is characterized by the same encryption key 
as the decryption key. This scheme adopts the DES 
encryption standard, the packet length is 64 bits, and the key 
length is also 64 bits. There are 8 parity bits in the key, and 
the actual key length is 56 bits. Although DES has been 
replaced by AES, the encryption strength is sufficient for this 
application and the computational complexity is lower than 
AES. The modular multiplication that AES needs to use is 
too computationally intensive for embedded processors and 
is not suitable for encrypting real-time collected ECG data 
streams. 
D. Key security strength 
Considering the possibility that the device-side key is 
forcibly cracked by an attacker, a mechanism for periodically 
changing the key can be adopted. In general, the life of an 
electrocardiograph is 10 years. If you change the key once a 
month, you need 120 keys for a total of 960 bytes. The cloud 
server's cost of storing 1 million groups of lifetime keys is 
960M, which is still affordable. 
E. Key generation 
The composition of the key on each terminal device: 120 
random numbers are stored as a key sequence, and the total 
length is 960 bytes. The server can generate a sequence of 
random numbers with a length of 960M at a time, and then 
sequentially intercept 960 bytes for each device. The key of 
the device and the offset of the key sequence in the server-
side master key are recorded in the device's secure memory. 
The server records the product serial number of each device 
and the corresponding random number sequence index value. 
As long as the random number is guaranteed not to be copied 
by internal spies during the manufacturing process, the 
security of the key can be ensured. 
F. Key deployment 
The device should have a 1K capacity of secure 
memory(TRSM). The 120 user data encryption keys (960 
bytes long random number) of the full life are loaded into the 
machine's secure memory at one time when the machine is 
shipped from the factory. If the device is out of service, you 
can use these keys in a rolling loop. The device does not 
update the key after it leaves the factory, preventing the key 
from being intercepted by the attacker during delivery. 
After the device leaves the factory, it is no longer 
necessary to transfer the user data encryption key under any 
condition, which eliminates the possibility of the key data 
packet being intercepted. 
G. Key verification 
The main purpose of key verification is to test whether 
the encryption-related hardware and software systems are 
defective. 
After the machine is assembled, read out the 120 key 
values in the secure memory, and the MD5 value of the keys 
is calculated and sent to the cloud server along with the 
product serial number. If the server-side verification is 
successful, the key can be considered to have been deployed 
correctly. If you are worried about the collision of MD5 
values, you can pre-calculate all device keys on the server 
side in advance, and delete the key segments with MD5 
duplicates. The probability of such a problem in theory is 
extremely small. 
H. Key synchronization 
Through the above steps, we deployed the same user data 
encryption key sequence on the terminal device and the 
cloud server, but how to use the two is still a problem. 
Ideally, using timestamp as a synchronization parameter is 
the best solution. The two parties can agree that, from the 
date of leaving the factory, the natural month is used as the 
measurement granularity, and a new key is replaced every 
natural month. 
The problem is that in the actual use environment, the 
time accuracy of the device side is completely unsecured. On 
the one hand, the RTC (Real Time Clock) devices based on 
quartz crystal oscillators do not achieve such precision, and 
some devices run faster than others. On the other hand, the 
RTC backup power failure is difficult to avoid, and the 
device cannot be abandoned because the clock is inaccurate. 
Furthermore, if the user is allowed to adjust the device time, 
the attacker can take advantage of this adjustment 
opportunity to detect the subsequent ciphertext form in 
advance, which will be a significant security hole. 
In the case of networking, the server can know the 
number of key-used-times on the terminal device. When the 
server finds that the consumption speed of the terminal key is 
too slow, it is expected that the pre-stored 120 keys will not 
be used in the entire product life cycle, and the maximum-
key-used-times value can be modified by the key agreement 
protocol (change the maximum-key-used-times to be small). 
First, a temporary communication key for modifying the 
maximum-key-used-times value is negotiated using the 
Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. The generator 
element p of the large prime number Q and the rational 
number domain FQ is required to be pre-agreed between the 
server and the device. Q and p are written into the device's 
TRSM at the factory. The algorithm for generating the 
temporary communication key K is as follows: 
 1, The server generates a random number x, 
calculates A = px mod Q, and sends it to the terminal; 
 2, The terminal generates a random number y, 
calculates B = py mod Q, and sends it to the server; 
 3, The terminal calculates K = Ay mod Q, and the 
server calculates K = Bx mod Q, which proves that 
the two K values are equal. 
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In this way, the server and the terminal share the random 
number K as a temporary communication key for modifying 
the maximum-key-used-times, and the attacker cannot detect 
the communication content. Even if the content can be 
cracked by the attacker, it is only an index value, and the key 
cannot be derived. 
The server should record the timestamp of modify the 
maximum-key-used-times value to avoid modifying it too 
frequently. Modify it 1 to 3 times a month is enough. In the 
case where the hardware can ensure the security of the key, it 
is not necessarily meaningful to change the key too 
frequently. 
III. DATA COMPRESSION UPLOAD SCHEME DESIGN 
Channel eavesdropping is a common attack method. In 
the Internet environment, it is easy to intercept 
communication packets on the network line by means of 
route bypass. The scheme adopts data compression and then 
encrypts and transmits, as shown in Fig. 1, which further 
increases the attacking difficulty of the attacker while 
reducing the load of the network. After the cracker obtains 
the message, the compressed file can be restored by the 
exhaustive cracking method; since the key used for the two 
encryptions is different, the original data obtained from the 
compressed file needs to be cracked again. A legitimate 
cloud server stores the original key from the factory. It is 
easy to calculate the compression key from the original key. 
Conversely, since the hash function is irreversible, it is not 
feasible to derive the original key from the compression key, 
and the attacker can only crack it by the exhaustive method. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Two encryption processes 
Both ciphers in Fig. 1 use the DES algorithm. The hash 
function uses the MD5 algorithm. MD5 requires a 64-byte 
input to generate a 16-byte output. In order to meet the input 
requirements of MD5, the consecutive 8 keys in the key 
queue are taken as a set of parameters. After the key expires 
and the next key is replaced, the parameter group is pushed 
back and used in turn. 
Data compression can use Shannon coding or Huffman 
coding. But today there are many mature methods that can be 
used, and there is no need to reinvent the wheel for a little 
performance boost. We use two classical algorithms to 
compress a 100M size data file. The performance is shown in 
Table 1. 
It can be seen that the data is de-duplicated and then 
compressed, and the compression ratio is the highest, which 
is beneficial to network transmission. The amount of data 
generated by the ECG machine per minute is about 0.7M, 
and the compression algorithm takes less than 2 seconds, 
which is equivalent to 1/30 processor occupancy, and the 
system can fully withstand this burden. 
TABLE I.  CLASSIC COMPRESSION ALGORITHM PERFORMANCE TEST 
Algorithm 
Compression 
Ratio 
Time Consuming 
 (Seconds) 
gzip (Compression) 36.2% 452 
dedup (Remove Duplicates) 51.5% 78 
First gzip and then dedub 26.8% 468 
First dedub and then gzip 14.6% 203 
 
IV. EXPERIMENT AND VERIFICATION 
In order to verify the effectiveness of the security system, 
the following practical application scenarios are designed to 
carry out crack attacks on the remote ECG system. 
Attack target: obtain the patient raw data. 
Experimental conditions: Provide 10 attack devices and 
an ECG signal generator to the attack team, and informed the 
key length and encryption algorithm, the attacker tried on an 
Intel E5-2660 (ten core) server, perform no more than 100 
hours of calculations on each machine to obtain its patient 
raw data. 
Experimental results: After several times of improving 
the attack plan, the attacker violently cracked the data 
records stored in the device by exhaustive cryptography, and 
successfully cracked two terminal devices within the 
specified calculation time, and the cracking time was 75 
hours and 40 hours respectively. 
In the case that the device is not disassembled, the 
communication message received by the network cannot be 
successfully cracked. 
Experiments prove that this system is not completely 
unbreakable in the case of hardware damage, but the cost of 
cracking is very expensive, and it is not worth the loss. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The ECG information security solution proposed in this 
paper adopts the method of preset multi-key-per-machine at 
the factory to avoid leakage caused by personnel factors, and 
uses the hash function to generate a secondary password for 
communication encryption during network transmission. 
Experiments show that this program can effectively resist the 
existing various attack methods and fully protect patient data 
security. 
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